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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 14H8 
-vs- : 
RONALD JOE MINNISH, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, appeals from 
/* a conviction of murder in the second degree in the Third 
#Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, was convicted 
by a jury verdict of murder in the second degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1975), on 
May 14, 1975. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the 
Utah St^te Prison on May 21, 1975, for a term of five years 
to life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered by the 
jury at the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
related in appellant's brief with the following additions 
and corrections: 
1. Evidence was introduced indicating that the 
appellant had been carrying a gun on him a few hours 
before the fatal shooting, and that the owner of the 
Indigo Lounge had told him tQ take it outside (T.I-13, 
14,22). Testimony also indicated that the appellant 
apparently told the deceased that he "packed" a gun 
and that he knew that the deceased did not have a gun 
on him (Tr.II-r23,24 ,38). 
2. Appellant and deceased appeared to be more 
or less friendly most of the evening (T.1-15;11-21) 
although the evidence introduced indicated that during 
the evening both individuals may have spoken in loud 
voices (Tr.1-22,27). The appellant testified that 
they were not arguing, but merely discussing professional 
boxing and other topics (Tr.II-107) . Evidence was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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admitted showing that right before, the fight, the 
deceased tried to shake hands with the appellant 
(Tr.I~57). 
3. Brent Barnes, a patron of the Indigo 
Lounge, testified that at one point the appellant 
got up and started to go outside and then the deceased 
got up and followed him out. Barnes testified he 
followed them out because he understood they were 
going to fight (Tr.1-28,41,42). "The talk was 
actually that Minnish was giving Gomer (deceased) 
a hard time because he stuttered." (Tr.I-42). 
4* The evidence that was introduced showed that 
the appellant did not get up to leave the bar with the 
intention of going home. The bartender of the Indigo 
Lounge testified that "He got up and he said, fI will 
be right back.'" (Tr.11-23). Also: 
"Q. [Was it] apparent to you 
that Mr. Minnish was not [returning]? 
A. No. He left his change on 
the bar and his drink and he said he would 
be right back. 
Q. I thought you said he was 
going? 
A. No. I said he said, 'I'll 
be right back.' He took a sip out 
of his drink and sat it down and said 
•I'll be right back.'" (Tr.11-39). 
5. When the deceased returned to the bar after 
the fight, he indicated his concern about possibly having 
hurt appellant (Tr.I-31;II-26). He also said to Crofford 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Stevens, a patron referring to the fight: 
"Come here. I want to show 
you what I done. I want you to 
come outside with me. I want 
you to see what I've done. I 
didn't want to do it." (Tr.I-58). 
6. Fred Manning and the deceased went back out-
side to check on appellant's condition. Evidence indicated 
that while outside, the deceased tried to apologize to 
appellant, saying: "I always wanted to be friends." (Tr. 
IT69). "Please, I want to be your friend; I didn't mean 
to do what I did." (Tr.1-69-70). See also Tr.I-74;II-26,27 . 
Shortly thereafter, Manning and deceased returned to the bar 
(Tr.I-33). 
7. The appellant pulled his revolver out of his 
International Travel-All (Tr.I-71). 
8. The appellant returned to the bar and walked 
up to the deceased. He pulled his revolver out of his 
pocket and aimed at the deceased (Tr.1-34,44;II-27). 
9. Upon seeing the gun the deceased backed up 
several feet, then grabbed a bar stool and tossed it at 
the appellant (Tr.1-35,47,60;II-27-29). 
10 . Fred Manning grabbed for appellant's arm but 
was shaken off. Moments later appellant fired the shot 
which killed the deceased (Tr.1-35,49,60,61;II-29). 
11. Appellant went toward the door, was told to 
stop by one of the patrons; then he pointed the gun toward 
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those inside, and then left (Tr.I-38,39,51,61)• 
12. The Deputy Sheriff testified that he received 
a dispatch to observe an International Travel-All in his 
area (Tr.11-1,2). He testified that the road conditions 
were ice-packed and very slick (Tr.II-2). The evidence 
indicated that when the deputy stopped the appellant, the 
appellant was having some difficulty maneuvering but 
that that was not unusual because of the weather conditions 
(Tr.II-5). 
13. The deputy observed the murder weapon 
partially visible from underneath the appellant's vehicle 
(Tr.II-6). 
14• As a result of his gunshot wound, the deceased 
died December 14, 1974. The appellant was tried by a jury 
and convicted of murder in the second degree. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR ALTERCATION INVOLVING THE 
VICTIM. 
The rules of evidence concerning the character of 
the deceased in a homicide case vary depending on the facts 
involved, whether the evidence of character is shown by 
-5-
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specific instances, general reputation or past convictions, 
and in some jurisdictions whether the accused knew of the 
victim's alleged reputation. The Utah Rules of Evidence, 
effective July 1, 1971, provide that whether or not a 
trial judge should exclude admissible evidence is within 
the court's discretion: Rule 45 states: 
"Except as in these rules 
otherwise provided, the judge may 
in his discretion exclude evidence 
if he finds that its probative 
value is substantially outweighed 
by the risk that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumption 
of time, or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury, or (c) unfairly and harm-
fully surprise a party who has not had 
reasonable opportunity to anticipate 
that such evidence would be offered." 
The trial record reveals that the court rejected appellant's 
proffer of evidence because he felt the deceased's character 
was not an ultimate issue (Tr.11-93,94), thereby not 
bringing the question under Rule 46, infra. 
Respondent claims that the trial court was correct, 
that the deceased's character was not an ultimate issue in 
the trial because appellant never established its probative 
value. However, even if the deceased's character were 
relevant under Rule 46, respondent contends the evidence 
appellant wanted to submit was still properly excluded. 
-6-
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Rule 46 states: 
"When a person's character or 
a trait of his character is in issue, 
it may be proved by testimony in the 
form of opinion, evidence of reputation, 
or evidence of specific instances of 
the person's conduct, subject, however, 
to the limitations of Rules 47 and 48." 
Rule 47 states: 
"Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of 
a person's character is relevant as 
tending to prove his conduct on a speci-
fied occasion, such trait may be proved 
in the same manner as provided by Rule 
46, except that (a) evidence of specific 
instances of conduct other than evidence 
of conviction of a crime which tends to 
prove the trait to be bad shall be 
inadmissible. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
In the trial, appellant sought to admit evidence pertaining 
to a specific incident of deceased's conduct which was not 
evidence of a conviction. 
"Mr. Van Sciver: Let me make 
a proffer with respect to that which I 
think is appropriate under the rule, as 
I understand it. 
I am now going to back off from 
the suggestion I will prove two incidents 
which are unfortunate, but I have had a 
witness who has decided maybe after all 
it wasn't Mr. Pearson. And I have a 
problem with that in my own mind because 
it is so far removed, it is about 
eight years old. The incident I do want 
to be introduced and which I will now 
talk about involves a gentle man by the 
name of Tom A. Osborne. . . ." (Tr.11-86). 
In People v. Soules, 41 C.A.2d 298, 106 P.2d 639 
(1940), the Third District Court of Appeals of California 
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upheld the second degree murder conviction of a defendant 
who claimed that the trial court erred by refusing to admit 
evidence showing that the victim had committed former 
acts of violence against other persons. 
"It is true that, in some 
jurisdictions, under proper circum-
stances, evidence of prior specific 
acts of violence by the defendant 
upon other individuals may be 
shown in a subsequent trial for 
murder where the accused admits the 
homicide and first establishes a 
prima facie case of necessary self-
defense. Evidence of prior acts J 
of violence by the defendant upon 
other persons, of which the accused 
has previous knowledge, is sometimes 
admitted, after proof that the 
defendant had knowledge that the 
deceased previously threatened him, 
on the theory that such evidence, 
in view of the former threats, would 
reflect some light on the question of 
whether the defendant killed his 
antagonist in the honest belief that 
he was about to receive great bodily 
harm at his hands. It is asserted, in 
support of the competency of such evidence 
of prior acts of violence against other 
persons, that knowledge of the fact 
that a person who had previously 
threatened the defendant, was a violent, 
turbulent and dangerous man, would furnish 
some cause for a man to reasonably assume 
that he was about to receive great bodily 
harm from him, and therefore justify 
killing him, provided the surrounding 
circumstances otherwise warranted 
that conclusion. In other words, it is 
argued that knowledge of the fact that 
an antagonist is a bad and dangerous 
man may reasonably increase one's fear 
of him. 
-8-
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It is, however, apparent that 
even if such evidence is competent, 
under certain circumstances, it 
should be received with caution for 
the reason that it is remote, 
weak, collateral to the real issue, 
confusing to the jury, unsatisfactory 
and difficult to rebut. To entitle 
such evidence to any substantial 
weight it would be necessary to adduce 
proof of the circumstances of each 
previous affray to fairly determine 
whether the deceased was warranted in 
acting as he did. For those reasons 
the great weight of authority holds 
that evidence of such prior specific 
acts of violence by the deceased upon 
other persons is not admissible 
upon trial of a subsequent offense. 
It is almost uniformly held that proof 
of the turbulent, violent and 
dangerous character of a person, 
offered for the purpose of concluding 
therefrom that he was more likely to 
have been the aggressor in an affray 
which resulted in his death, must be 
established by evidence of his general 
reputation for peace and quiet in the 
community where he resides." Id. at 
642. (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Mason, 208 Kan. 39, 490 P.2d 418 (19 
Generally, for evidence pertaining to the 
character of the victim to be admitted, the defendant 
must show that he acted in self-defense. 40 C.J.S. 
Homicide § 272(c) explains under what circumstances a 
defendant may not claim self-defense: 
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"Evidence of the dangerous 
and violent character of deceased 
is not admissible where• at the 
time such evidence is offered, it 
appears from the evidence already 
introduced that accused provoked 
the difficulty, or was the assailant, 
where he was in no danger of loss of 
life or serious bodily harm, or did not 
believe himself to be in such danger, or 
there was nothing to excite the fears of 
a reasonable man that such danger existed; 
where he did not retreat while he might 
safety have done so; where deceased was 
retreating or running away from accused 
at the time of the killing, or had 
declined further to combat before the 
fatal shot was fired; or where it is 
claimed that the killing was 
accidental, or accused denies that he 
killed deceased." 
See also McCaghren v. State, 294 So.2d 756 (Ala. Ct. of 
Appeals, 1973); reversed on other grounds, 292 Ala. 378, 
294 So.2d 766 (1973). In State v. Sherrill, 496 S.W.2d 
321 (Mo. App. 1973) , the Court affirmed the second degree 
murder conviction where the defendant, rather than remain 
in the tavern or retreat when his codefendants pursued 
the victim outside the bar, himself actively pursued the 
deceased resulting in a struggle fatal to the victim. The 
Court discussed the circumstances in which a defendant 
may claim self-defense: 
-10-
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"Additional reasons negate this 
defense by defendant. The right to kill 
in self-defense rests in real or 
apparently real, necessity . . . One 
who was the aggressor or who provoked 
the difficulty in which he killed another 
cannot invoke the right of self-defense 
to excuse or justify the homicide, unless 
he had previously, in good faith, withdrew 
from the combat in such a manner as to 
have shown in his intention in good faith 
to desist. . . 
Self-defense is a last resort and in 
order to justify a homicide on such grounds 
the doer of the homicidal act must have 
done everything in his power, consistent 
with his own safety, to avoid the danger 
and avert the necessity, and he must retreat, 
if retreat be practicable." Id. at 325, 326. 
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently addressed 
itself to the question of self-defense. In State v. Schoenfeld, 
545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976), this Court upheld the conviction of 
negligent homicide where the defendant claimed self-defense, 
stating: 
" . . . Under our law a person is 
legally justified in using force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force used 
is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or to a third 
person. 
However, a person is not justified 
in using force under the circumstances set 
forth in the preceding paragraph if he 
either: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of 
force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily 
harm upon the assailant; or 
« n -
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(b) Is attempting to commit, is 
committing, or is fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of 
a felony and, under the law, it is a 
felony if one uses a deadly weapon in 
. threatening to do bodily injury to 
another and accompanies that threat by 
a show of immediate force of violence; or 
* * * 
An agressor is one who willingly and 
knowingly initially provokes a combat or 
does acts of such a nature as would 
ordinarily lead to combat. A person can 
also be classified as an aggressor if 
he leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms 
himself, and then returns to the scene 
and renews the quarrel." Id. at 196. 
Respondent contends that the trial court properly 
excluded the evidence pertaining to the victim because the 
appellant was never in a position to claim self-defense. 
In the case at bar the evidence did not prove that the 
victim was the aggressor of their original fight outside 
the Indigo Lounge and in fact there was evidence to the 
contrary, namely, that appellant was belittling the victim 
because he stuttered (Tr.I-42). Further, the victim went 
back outside to see if he had hurt the appellant (Tr.I-31), 
a witness testifying that "he meant to be friendly, again, 
apparently it sounded like he wanted to apologize." 
(Tr.1-68-70). Then appellant followed the victim back 
inside after first getting his gun. Appellant did not 
retreat, assuming he ever did in fact fear the victim, but 
-12-
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rather he armed himself and followed the deceased back 
into the bar. Again, once inside the bar, there was no 
evidence of provocation by the deceased, yet appellant 
walked in, pulled his gun out, aimed, and moments later 
fired the fatal shot (Tr.I~60, 61) . 
Appellant relies on State v. Griffin, 99 Ariz* 
43, 406 P.2d 397 (1965), to support his contention that 
the evidence should have been admitted. It is true that the 
Court in Griffin did say it was error for the trial court to 
refuse to admit evidence of the victim's reputation of 
argumentativeness, belligerence, and quarrelsomeness; but in 
Griffin, there was a strong showing that the defendant acted 
in self-defense. Even more important, the appellate court found 
there were several other errors, and the court reversed, 
without stating specific grounds and apparently reversing 
because of the accumulation of errors. The Court in Griffin 
never said that the trial court's refusal to admit the 
evidence of character was a reversible error. 
Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354 (1960), cited 
by appellant, is also distinguished on the basis of a clear 
showing of self-defense on the part of the defendant. In 
Evans, the defendant, a woman, was walking at 5:00 a.m. in 
Washington, D.C., when deceased walked up to her and asked 
whether she was "out for some sporting." When she rebuffed 
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him, deceased attacked her, ripping off some of her 
clothes. She admitted stabbing him with a knife she 
claimed she had for self-defense. Missing from Evans was 
evidence that the defendant was the aggressor or in any other 
way not eligible for the claim of self-defense. It should 
be noted that in both Griffin and Evans, there were problems 
concerning the witnesses. In Griffin, the only witnesses 
were the defendants ex-wife and a friend of the victim. 
In JSvans, there was evidence of other witnesses but the 
incident occurred at 5:00 a.m., making eye-witness more 
difficult. In the instant case, there were several detached 
witnesses to the events of the evening the appellant shot 
the victim. This distinction is important because the 
decision whether or not to admit evidence pertaining to the 
victim is based on the inquiry, "What did the deceased do?" 
The answer to this inquiry is better obtained by the direct 
evidence of eye witnesses than by conjecture as to what 
might have happened considering the defendant and victim 
involved. In Utah, if a judge thinks that evidence may 
"create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury," then by 
virtue of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, supra, 
he may exclude it. 
-14-
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This point is discussed in the case cited by 
appellant, State v. Maresf 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 
(1948). In Mares, the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder. At his trial, defendant introduced evidence 
that he and the deceased were intoxicated, that the deceased 
was the aggressor, and that he killed in self-defense. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the state could admit rebuttal 
testimony concerning the deceased's temperate habits, 
stating, "The real question to be determined is what did 
the deceased probably do?" ][d. at 866. The Court noted 
that there were no witnesses to this killing; the verdict 
turned solely on whether the jury believed the defendant's 
story or the state's version. Respondent submits that 
generally where there are no witnesses and the conduct of 
the deceased is unknown, then it would be proper for a trial 
court to admit evidence as to deceased's character in a case 
where the defendant claims self-defense. Respondent contends, 
however, that such is not the case at bar. The shooting of 
Pearson was witnessed by several objective witnesses. The 
transcript is replete with testimony that the deceased was not 
an aggressor when appellant approached with his gun and shot 
him. There is no question concerning the deceased's conduct 
in this case and therefore the trial court was free to exclude 
the evidence of character. Respondent submits that there 
-i 5_ 
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where the conduct of the deceased is known or unclear, 
then it is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to admit or exclude evidence concerning his 
character. 
I n
 Cole v. State, 193 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1966), 
also cited by appellant, the Florida Supreme Court 
cites one of its earlier opinions, Garner v. State, 
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891): 
"Evidence of the violent and 
dangerous character of the deceased 
is admissible to show, or as tending 
to show, that a defendant has acted in 
self-defense, or, in other words, under 
such circumstances as would have 
naturally caused a man of ordinary 
reason to believe that he was at the time 
of killing in imminent danger of losing 
his life or suffering great bodily harm 
at the hands of the deceased; but it 
is not admissible for this purpose 
except where it explains, or will 
give meaning, significance, or point 
to the conduct of the deceased at the 
time of the killing, or will tend to 
do so; and such conduct of the deceased, 
at the time of the killing, which it is 
proposed thus to explain, must be shown 
before the auxiliary evidence of such 
character can be introduced." Cole v. 
State, 193 So.2d at 48. 
It is important to note that there were no witnesses to 
the actual killing in Cole, but there was direct evidence 
that the deceased was the aggressor and that the defendant 
may well have acted in self-defense. 
-1 £~ 
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The facts of the instant case do not bring 
it under the authority cited by the appellant. The 
trial court acted properly within its discretion in 
excluding the evidence of a prior altercation involving 
the victim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE 
CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER WERE PROPER AND IN 
ACCORD WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (SUPP. 1975). 
The trial court instructed the jury that the 
appellant was charged with criminal homicide, second 
degree murder, as per the information (Record, 46). 
The Court defined the culpable mental states (inten-
tionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal 
negligence) in Instruction No. 11: 
"Considering these factors, 
our law states that a person engages 
in conduct: * * * 3. 'Recklessly1 
when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that under 
the existing circumstances the 
result will occur." (Record, Al.) 
The Instruction is in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(3) (1953), as amended: 
"(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, 
with respect to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he is aware of but 
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consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the cir-
cumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint." 
What the appellant is arguing is that some of 
the language in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (c) which now 
defines murder in the second degree has previously been 
interpreted by this Court to encompass a fact situation 
unlike the one in the instant case; specifically, that 
the evidence did not disclose that the appellant created 
a grave risk of death to any person other than the victim 
or that the appellant acted with depraved indifference 
to human life. Appellant cites State v. Russell/ 106 
Utah 116/ 145 P.2d 1003 (1944), which states that this 
language requires that the actor's act must be one dangerous 
to other persons as well as the victim and not directed 
at any one person in particular. Respondent does not 
disagree with appellant's reading of Russell/ but claims 
that nonetheless there is no merit to appellant's 
argument. 
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Utah's new Criminal Code, effective July 1, 
1973, abrogated the old code (with exceptions provided 
for by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (Supp. 1975)); and 
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (Supp. 1975), 
the new code abolished common law crimes. Some 
offenses which would have been first degree murder under 
the old code now under the new code constitute second 
degree murder. Under the old code, second degree 
murder was "any other homicide committed under such 
1 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (Supp. 1975), states: 
"(1) The provisions of this 
code shall govern the construction of, 
the punishment for, and defenses against 
any offense defined in this code or, 
except where otherwise specifically 
provided or the context otherwise 
requires, any offense defined outside 
this code; provided such offense was 
committed after the effective date of 
this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior 
to the effective date of this code shall 
be governed by the law, statutory and 
non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense 
or limitation on punishment available 
under this code shall be available to 
any defendant tried or retried after the 
effective date. An offense under the 
laws of this state shall be deemed to 
have been committed prior to the effective 
date of this act if any of the elements of 
the offense occurred prior thereto." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (Supp. 1975), states: "Common 
law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless 
made so by this code, other applicable statute or 
ordinance." 
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circumstances as would have constituted murder at common 
law" but not amounting to first degree murder. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953), as amended (now repealed). 
Under the new code, to be convicted of second degree 
murder, the evidence must prove that the homicide was 
committed under one of the circumstances under subpara-
graph (a) through (d) of Section 76-5-203. The new 
code eliminates the uncertainty as to the definition 
of murder in the second degree because of its former 
relationship to the common law. 
The cases relied upon by the appellant were 
decided under the authority of the old code; those 
decisions cannot now be maintained as authority for 
statutory interpretation under the new code, especially 
when, as in this case, the language is not even the same.' 
2 Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953), as amended, now 
repealed, definition of first degree murder included: 
". . . perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to 
the lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind, 
regardless of human life. . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (in effect) definition of 
second degree murder includes: "Acting under circum-
stances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he recklessly engaged in conduct which causes 
a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes 
the death of another. . . ." 
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Whether the appellant's conduct falls within the 
definition of Section 76-5-203 (c) is a question of fact for 
the jury. The transcript reveals that the trial court took 
appellantfs motion to strike Section 76-5-203(c) from the 
Information under advisement (Tr.11-85). The advantage 
in doing so was for the court to hear the evidence presented 
at trial to see if the instruction was supported by a reason-
able interpretation of evidence. The trial court ruled that 
it did, and properly left the question to the triers of 
fact. 
Last, even assuming that the appellant's argument 
is valid, the evidence was clear that the appellant did 
endanger the lives of the others in the bar and that his 
act was not directed at any one person. The appellant 
came into the bar after the deceased with a gun, knowing 
it to be loaded (Tr.III-116), and admittedly under the 
influence of alcohol. He shot the deceased and proceeded 
to point his gun at those people inside the bar. The 
appellant himself testifed that the trigger of his gun 
was fixed so that it could go off very easily. He 
testified that the fingerguard and the hammer had been 
removed. 
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Q. Wouldn't it be true, it would give 
you more ready access to the firing of the gun? 
You wouldn't have to stick your finger in it? 
" A. •' I would think that would be a safety 
hazard myself, not having the guard around the 
trigger. 
By appellant's own admission, his gun 
was even more dangerous than an ordinary gun. In 
light of the evidence introduced that the appellant 
was under the influence of intoxicants, that his 
gun was easily discharged, and that he pointed it 
directly at the people in the bar, after having 
just shot one of them, it is clear the evidence 
supported a reasonable interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-503 (c). 
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POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER. 
This court, in accord with long established 
precedent, has held it will not review the sufficiency 
of evidence as to the rectitude of an appellant's 
conviction, unless there is a clear showing that the 
evidence could not support the conviction. See 
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909 (1930); Wyatt 
v. Baughman, 121 Utah 2d 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951). In 
short, there is a strong presumption attached to the 
validity of the trial court judgment and every reason-
able intendment must be indulged in support of such 
judgment until and unless the complaining party can 
demonstrate the error of such judgment. Burton v. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 
P.2d 514 (1952). In the instant case there is no 
affirmative showing that conviction was obtained with-
out sufficiency of evidence. 
Additionally, in order to get its case before 
the jury, the state need only present evidence of each 
element of the crime charged. As stated in the case 
of Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 
P.2d 205 (1953): 
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"In order to establish a 
prima facie case plaintiff must 
present some evidence of every 
element needed to make out a cause 
of action.11 Id. at 207. 
The evidence introduced by the state which 
makes out the prima facie case is as follows: 
1. Following a fight with the deceased the 
appellant took his gun from his automobile, pursued the 
deceased, and shot him knowing him to be unarmed. 
There were eye-witnesses to this entire incident. 
2. Appellant did so, having some knowledge of guns 
CT. Ill-lie); ] and within a range of a few feet from 
the victim. 
3. Although there was evidence that the 
appellant had had much to drink during that day and 
evening, it was a question of fact whether he was 
capable of forming the requisite mens rea for the 
crime. The jury found that he did. 
4. The appellant pointed the gun at the other 
people in the bar as he was leaving. He did so, knowing 
the gun was loaded (Tr. III-116) and knowing that the 
trigger could go off easily because the fingerguard had 
been removed from it (Tr.III-116). 
5. The man the appellant shot died from the 
wound he received. 
Such evidence was sufficient to at least take the 
case to the jury for determination. Once the case went 
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to the jury, there was clearly sufficient evidence 
for reasonable minds acting on it to have found the 
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
jury can find not only facts directly proved by the 
evidence, but any additional facts which are reason-
able inferences of the facts proved. State v. Kazda, 
15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
Thus, it is clear that the jury could, from 
the evidence and reasonable inferences, have found 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For the appellant to prevail on an assertion 
of insufficiency of evidence: 
" . . . it must appear that, 
viewing the evidence and all 
fair inferences reasonably to 
be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the juryfs 
verdict, reasonable minds could 
not believe them guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but would 
necessarily entertain some sub-
stantial doubt of their guilt." 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 
307 P.2d 212 (1957). 
Also, it is settled that a jury verdict will not be 
reversed merely because reasonable minds may have had a 
reasonable doubt or that conflicting inferences might 
have been drawn from the evidence. A recent expression 
by this court on the matter is contained in State v. 
Sullivan, supra: 
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"But it is not sufficient merely 
that reasonable minds may have enter-
tained such doubt. Before a verdict 
may properly be set aside, it must 
appeal that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly upon 
it must ha:ve entertained reasonable 
doubt that defendants committed the 
crime." 302 P.2d at 212 (Emphasis 
added). 
In State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 
584 (1937), this court stated: 
"The fact that there was some 
contradictory evidence or that 
conflicting inferences might 
reasonably be deduced from the 
evidence does not warrant us 
in disturbing the verdict of the 
jury." Id. at 568 (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the verdict of the jury is given great weight, 
and will only be reversed if it is shown that there 
is no evidence upon which it could reasonably be based. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the trial court committed 
no error in this case prejudicial to the rights of the 
appellant in the admission of evidence, the instructions, 
or in any of the other rulings made in the trial of 
this case. Respondent submits that there is substantial 
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evidence in the record to sustain the jury's verdict 
of second degree murder. Respondent further submits 
that this court should not disturb those findings of 
fact and should affirm the conviction of the appellant 
as adjudged in the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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